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1. Introduction 
 
On 18 December 2014 the OECD released the public discussion draft on interest deductions 
and other financial payments (“the discussion draft”). The discussion draft deals with the first 
topic covered by Action 4 of the Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting.
2
 Action 4 
calls for the development of recommendations regarding best practices in the design of rules 
to prevent base erosion through the use of interest expense and other financial payments that 
are economically equivalent to interest payments. Action 4 also refers to the development of 
transfer pricing guidance for related party financial transactions. This issue is not addressed in 
the discussion draft. The discussion draft only looks at a number of different options for 
approaches to tackle base erosion and profit shifting (“beps”) through the use of interest cost. 
It is observed that “there is a sense that unilateral action by countries is failing to tackle some 
of the issues at the heart of this problem. Partly, this is because the fungibility of money and 
the flexibility of financial instruments have made it possible for groups to bypass the effect of 
[unilateral interest limitation rules]”.3 A consistent approach utilising international 
best practices is needed. This aim may be best achieved “through rules which encourage 
groups to adopt funding structures which more closely align the interest expense of individual 
entities with that of the overall group. Overall, however, in general groups should still be able 
to obtain tax relief for an amount equivalent to their actual third party interest cost.”4  
 
The present author welcomes the worldwide approach that is suggested in the discussion 
draft. This article discusses the discussion draft’s approach to tackle beps through the use of 
interest cost. Paragraph 2 outlines the main policy concerns. Paragraph 3 provides an 
overview of the discussion draft’s worldwide approach. Paragraph 4 will examine whether the 
worldwide interest allocation rule meets the policy concerns. 
 
2. Main policy concerns 
 
2.1. Introductory remarks 
 
The critical objective of the discussion draft is to identify solutions to address beps using 
interest on third-party and related party loans. In addition the discussion draft recognises the 
following policy issues
5
: (i) avoiding double taxation, (ii) providing certainty of outcome and 
                                               
1 J. Vleggeert is associate professor at the institute for tax law of the University of Leiden. The present author 
thanks Anna Gunn for her input to this article.  
2 OECD (2013), Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing.  
3 Para 5. 
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minimising distortions to competition and investment and (iii) EU law issues. In addition the 
author shall address whether an interest limitation rule that is based on a world-wide approach 
provides a balanced allocation of interest cost between the entities of a multinational group. 
These issues will be discussed hereafter. 
 
2.2. Addressing beps 
 
In most countries, interest on debt is subject to certain conditions treated as deductible for the 
payer and taxed in the hands of the payee. In a cross-border context debt financing can be 
used as a tool to erode the tax base. This creates competitive distortions between groups 
operating internationally and those operating in the domestic market.
6
 Techniques to achieve 
beps through the use of interest cost include (i) the use of intragroup loans to generate 
deductible interest cost in high tax jurisdictions and taxable interest income in low tax 
jurisdictions, (ii) the use of interest deductions on loans that fund the acquisition of equity 
participations that produce dividends which are exempt or deferred for tax purposes, (iii) the 
allocation of a disproportionate share of the group’s total third party interest cost to high-
taxed operating companies, and (iv) the development of hybrid mismatches (e.g. hybrid 
instruments which give rise to deductible interest expense but no corresponding taxable 
income).
7
 To be effective, a general interest limitation rule needs to tackle these beps 
techniques. 
 
2.3. Avoiding double taxation 
 
The discussion draft observes that “[r]ules to limit relief for interest deductions may result in 
double taxation where (i) the entity remains taxable on income funded by the interest, or (ii) 
the recipient of the interest remains taxable on the corresponding receipt.”8 In the author’s 
view, the first observation is incorrect. Whether the entity remains taxable on income funded 
by the interest or not is irrelevant for the purpose of determining whether double taxation 
arises as a result of an interest limitation rule. Double taxation may arise if interest that is not 
deductible for the debtor is taxable for the creditor (the second part of the discussion draft 
observation). However, even in that case double taxation will only arise if an amount of 
interest that is not deductible for the debtor is not matched by a corresponding deduction for 
another entity within the group. That is why the author suggests that a disallowance of a 
deduction of interest at the level of a thinly capitalised group company should be offset by a 
corresponding extra deduction of interest at the level of an overcapitalised group company.
9
 
Instead the discussion draft favours provisions for the carry forward of disallowed interest 
expense into future periods. Whatever choice is made, a general interest limitation rule should 
avoid that interest is subject to economic double taxation. 
 
2.4. Providing certainty of outcome and minimising distortions to competition and 
investment 
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According to the discussion draft, an interest limitation rule should be relatively 
straightforward to apply and the implications of the rule should be predictable. Moreover 
groups in the same economic position with respect to their funding should be treated 
consistently.
10
 Furthermore, in order to avoid groups shifting investment to countries with less 
restrictive rules, an interest limitation rule should be applied consistently by as many 
countries as possible. 
 
2.5. EU law issues 
 
The discussion draft recognizes the need to comply with the EU treaty freedoms, directives 
and State aid restrictions in order to enable the 28 EU Member States to implement the 
worldwide interest allocation rules. As the work on Action 4 progresses, further consideration 
will be given to these EU law issues and how they impact on the design of interest limitation 
rules.
11
 The discussion draft notes that there are a number of approaches that the countries 
involved have discussed in order to avoid a restriction of the EU treaty freedoms. Apparently, 
one of the approaches concerns an interest limitation rule that makes a distinction between 
domestic and cross-border situations, because the discussion draft recognises that 
consideration should be given the circumstances in which EU member states could justify a 
restriction of the EU treaty freedoms.
12
 In this context grounds of justification that need 
further examination are in particular (i) the need to preserve the balanced allocation between 
EU member states of the power to impose taxes, and (ii) the need to prevent tax avoidance 
and to combat artificial arrangements. The author will not make this analysis in this article. 
However, the author wants to address the situation where the analysis would show that a 
prima facie restriction cannot be justified. In that case, an interest limitation rule should in 
principle also apply to a group that operates domestically only. It follows that an entity that is 
part of a domestic group could be confronted with an amount of interest that is not deductible 
under an interest limitation rule. This result would conflict with the policy objectives 
underlying an interest limitation rule as a group that operates domestically only cannot be 
involved in beps.  
 
It could be argued, however, that domestic groups could avoid the application of an interest 
limitation rule by filing a consolidated tax return (fiscal unity). On the other hand, the 
threshold for filing a consolidated return may differ substantially from the criteria on the basis 
of which it is determined whether the company is part of a group for purposes of interest 
limitation rule. This can be illustrated by the Dutch thin capitalization-rules that applied from 
2004 to 2013. These rules aimed to counter the excessive allocation of interest expenses to 
Dutch entities that were part of an international group. However, in order to comply with the 
EU treaty freedoms, the thincap-rules also applied to domestic groups. In order to determine 
whether an entity was part of a group for purposes of the thincap-rules, general accepted 
accounting principles were decisive. Although domestic groups could avoid the application of 
thincap-rules by entering into a fiscal unity, many small and medium sized enterprises that 
operate only within the domestic context were still confronted with the thincap-rules. This 
was because in these situations, the threshold for forming a fiscal unity (95% shareholding) 
often provided harder to meet than the requirement of a group under the thincap-rules. 
The fact that domestic groups faced non-deductible interest as a result of the thincap-rules, 
was highly controversial and played a major role in the decision to repeal the rule as of 2013. 
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In the author’s view this illustrates that an interest limitation rule can only be sustainable if it 
avoids that domestic groups will be subject to economic double taxation on interest. 
 
2.6. A general interest limitation rule should be fair.  
 
The discussion draft’s chapter on policy considerations does not explicitly mention that a 
general interest limitation rule should be “fair”. The discussion draft does not define this 
concept, but it is clear that the principal concerns in this respect are to (i) enable groups to 
obtain tax relief for an amount equivalent to their actual third party interest cost, (ii) ensure 
that interest expense is matched with economic activity and (iii) use a worldwide approach.
13
 
These concerns are discussed hereafter from a policy perspective. These objectives can 
perhaps best be summarized as the desire to provide a balanced allocation of interest costs 
between the entities of a multinational group.  The above raises some interesting questions in 
relation to EU Law. These questions are outside the scope of the present article. 
 
The first objective that a group should be able to obtain tax relief for no more than the group's 
third party interest implies that it should not be possible to create additional deductions by 
entering into intragroup loans. This begs the question why these deductions should be denied 
or, in other words, why intragroup loans and third-party loans should be treated differently. 
According to the discussion draft: “a group-wide test directly addresses issues of base erosion 
where a group claims relief for interest expense in excess of its actual interest costs.”14 This 
implies that interest expenses on intragroup loans are not considered actual interest cost to the 
extent the additional deductions are created. Academics have submitted that intragroup loans 
are arguably a close or perfect substitute for equity.
15
 The author notes that the logical 
consequence of this would be to treat intragroup loans as equity for tax purposes. Such a rule 
would, however, not take account of the fact that many international groups have centralized 
treasury operations in a group entity that operates as the group's bank. In this case third-party 
loans are obtained by a group finance company and on lent to various entities within the 
group. A rule that treats intragroup loans as equity for tax purposes should therefore be 
supplemented to allow for a deduction of interest on intragroup loans to extent it represents  
third party interest incurred by the group finance company. The group-wide rule that the 
discussion draft proposes, is simpler: it does not explicitly treat intragroup loans as equity but 
instead directly attributes part of the group’s third party interest to the entities of the group. 
 
The second objective that interest expense should be matched with economic activity implies 
that a state should only allow deductions of interest on loans used to finance business 
operations through which a taxpayer generates income that is taxable in that state.
16
 Dividends 
received on shares in (foreign) participations are typically not subject to tax because of an 
exemption or an indirect credit. Therefore, interest on loans used to finance (foreign) 
subsidiaries should not be deductible for the taxpayer. Instead the interest on these loans 
should be attributed to the (foreign) subsidiaries in order to match deductible interest with 
taxable income. 
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The third objective is that an interest limitation rule should be based on a worldwide 
approach. This objective appears to be based on two propositions. The first proposition is in 
the words of Burnett that: “[a] multinational group’s choice of location for its third-party debt 
is influenced or even dominated by tax considerations.”17 The second proposition is that debt 
is fungible and that therefore for tax purposes each entity of a multinational group should 
have the same level of debt as the group as a whole.
18
 The author points out that a similar 
approach is used Part 1 of the Report on the “Attribution of Profits to Permanent 
Establishments”.19 In attributing equity and debt to a permanent establishment, the capital 
allocation approach uses as its point of reference the financing structure of the enterprise as a 
whole. In the view of the present author, the worldwide approach entails applying this 
principle by analogy to companies that are members of a group. 
 
3. Overview of the worldwide approach 
 
3.1. Introductory remarks 
 
3.1.1. Options for an interest limitation rule 
 
In order to establish a general interest limitation rule to tackle beps through the use of interest 
cost, the discussion draft starts by examining rules that are currently applied by countries. The 
discussion draft identifies three groups of rules that should be given further consideration.
20
 
The first group concerns fixed ratio rules which limit the level of interest expense in an entity 
with reference to a fixed ratio such as debt to equity ratios or interest to EBITDA ratios. The 
discussion draft observes that these rules are relatively easy to apply but that they are 
inflexible as they apply the same ratio to entities in all sectors. In addition “there is evidence 
that the rates at which these ratios are currently set are too high to be an effective tool in 
addressing base erosion and profit shifting.”21 The second group is group-wide rules which 
compare the level of debt in an entity by reference to the group's overall position (such as a 
debt to equity ratio). According to the discussion draft these rules are also easy to apply but 
“the amount of equity in an entity is not a good measure of its level of activity and equity 
levels can be easily subject to manipulation”.22 The third group is targeted rules. The 
discussion draft points out that these rules can be effective in addressing specific beps risks. 
However, they typically result in a complex system.
23
  
 
The countries engaged in the discussion draft agree that arm's-length tests, withholding taxes 
and rules which disallow a percentage of all interest paid by an entity should not form part of 
the consultation process.
24
 An alternative that is not discussed is rules which treat debt as 
equity. These rules disallow the deduction of interest because interest is qualified as dividend. 
Naturally these rules would be effective in countering beps, but apparently they deviate too 
strongly from the current tax system of the countries involved. Another option that is not 
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considered, is rules that treat equity as debt and consequently allow a deduction for a return 
on equity. This is understandable as these rules would create additional possibilities for base 
erosion. 
 
3.1.2. Preference for group-wide rules 
 
On balance the countries involved in the discussion draft appear to have a clear preference for 
group-wide rules: “Group-wide tests in theory have the greatest potential to tackle base 
erosion and profit shifting using interest.”25 The discussion draft points out that the ability of 
fixed ratio rules to address beps is much smaller because of the problem of setting the 
benchmark ratio at the correct level.
26
 And an approach based entirely on targeted rules is not 
suitable either because a comprehensive set of rules is expected to be too complex.
27
  
 
A group-wide rule limits the amount of interest which can be deducted by each entity to a part 
of the group’s third party interest expense. The discussion draft focuses on group-wide rules  
which work on two basic premises: “Firstly, that the best measure for total net interest 
deductions within a group is the group’s actual net third party interest expense (ie. total 
interest paid to third parties less total interest income received from third parties). Secondly, 
that within a group interest expense should be matched with economic activity. Where net 
interest expense is matched with economic activity, groups will obtain tax relief for an 
amount equivalent to their actual third party interest cost.”28 Economic activity can be 
measured by using earnings or asset values. If earnings are used, dividend income will be 
excluded to ensure that a high level of (exempt) dividend income increases the amount of 
interest that an entity can deduct.
29
 If asset values are used equity investments which give rise 
to (exempt) dividend income may be excluded.
30
 The following example
31
 illustrates how 
these rules could apply. 
 
Consolidated balance sheet 
Assets  1000 Equity 200 
   Debt 800 
 
Balance sheet holdco     Balance sheet foreign subsidiary 
Assets  400 Equity 200   Assets  600 Equity 150 
Participation 150 Debt 350      Debt 450 
 
It is assumed that the interest rate on debt is 10%. This means that the group’s actual net third 
party interest expense is 80 (10% of 800). This amount is allocated to holdco and foreign 
foreign subsidiary based on economic activity. Secondly it is assumed that economic activity 
is measured using assets as an allocation factor. The allocation factor divides holdco’s assets 
by the group’s assets. For purposes of calculating the relevant assets of holdco the equity 
investment of 150 is excluded. Consequently the amount of deductible interest that is 
allocated to holdco is 400/1000 x 80 is 32. As holdco’s actual interest expense amounts to 
10% of 350 is 35, holdco’s non-deductible interest is 3. The amount of deductible interest that 
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is allocated to foreign subsidiary is 600/1000 x 80 is 48. As foreign subsidiary’s actual 
interest expense amounts to 10% of 450 is 45, the subsidiary should be allowed an extra 
deduction of 3 in order to ensure that the group’s actual net third party interest expense of 80 
is fully deductible. That is however not the solution that the discussion draft proposes. Instead 
the discussion draft suggests to allow holdco a carry forward of the amount of non-deductible 
interest of 3 to future periods.  
 
In order to avoid that interest is not deductible, groups may seek to reorganise their intragroup 
financing. In fact the discussion draft intends to encourage groups to adopt funding structures 
that align interest expenses of individual entities with the amount that is deductible under a 
group-wide rule.
32
 As the application of the rule requires that the amount of a group’s third 
party interest or third-party debt and the amount of a group's earnings or assets is ascertained, 
the discussion draft recognises that the group's consolidated financial statements should be a 
good starting point for obtaining this information.
33
 
 
Having provided an overview of the approaches suggested in the discussion draft, paragraph 
3.2 – 3.7 will examine in more detail the main features of the group-wide rule that is put 
forward in the discussion draft. This article does not go into a number of more specific issues 
such as the scope of application of a group-wide rule, the definition of interest, a small entity 
exception, mismatches between tax and accounting rules and the treatment of groups in 
specific sectors. 
 
3.2. Reference to interest expense or debt? 
 
This paragraph discusses whether a group-wide rule should operate by reference to the level 
of interest expense or the level of debt. A rule that provides for the allocation of the entire  
interest expense within the group is, firstly,  in line with the principle that groups should be 
able to deduct no less and no more than their actual third party interest cost. A rule based on 
debt that uses the group’s average interest rate to determine an entity’s deductible level of 
interest expense would, secondly, be similar to an interest expense based rule. However if the 
entity’s (rather than the group’s) average interest rate is used in this respect, an entity’s 
deductible interest expense level could deviate from the amount allocated under an interest 
based rule. In this respect the discussion draft notes that such a rule may not deal with cases 
where an entity’s tax base is eroded using high interest rates.34 On the other hand, using an 
entity’s average interest rate rather than the group average interest rate may be a better 
reflection of economic reality in case an entity operates in a high or low interest rate 
environment.
35
 The discussion draft prefers interest expense-based rules.
36
 
 
Under an interest expense-based group-wide rule, the amount of interest expense of the group 
must be determined. The obvious way to obtain this information is to use the group's 
commercial consolidated financial statements. The author submits that the implication of this 
is that international financial reporting standards (IFRS) or general accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP) should be decisive in determining what is interest.
37
 If no specific 
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agreement is made in this respect, additional disparities may arise. Remarkably the discussion 
draft does not recognise this implication of using an interest expense-based rule. 
 
3.3. Deemed interest rule or interest cap rule 
 
3.3.1. Introductory remarks 
 
Under a deemed interest rule each group entity is allowed a deduction of the amount of the 
group's third party interest that is allocated to it irrespective of the amount of interest that is 
actually incurred. This can be illustrated on the basis of the example that is given in paragraph 
3.1. Under a deemed interest rule foreign subsidiary will be allowed an extra deduction of 3. 
In contrast under an interest cap rule the amount of the deduction cannot exceed the interest 
actually incurred. As a result foreign subsidiary will not be granted an extra deduction of 3. 
 
As the discussion draft points out, the choice between a deemed interest rule and an interest 
cap rule is fundamental to the operation of the group-wide rule.
38
 An important argument in 
favour of a deemed interest rule is that this rule ensures that the group's third party interest is 
deductible somewhere within the group. However, the countries involved in the discussion 
draft are concerned about opportunities for abuse if deemed interest rule were to be 
implemented: “For example, a deemed interest rule could operate as an incentive for groups to 
raise third party borrowings in countries which do not apply the rule and have the fewest 
protection against base erosion and profit shifting. A group could then benefit from a 
deduction for its actual interest cost which accrues in the entity which enters into the 
borrowing, and a second deemed deduction in group entities which are subject to an interest 
allocation rule.”39 Clearly there will be an incentive to shift borrowings to countries that have 
not implemented a worldwide interest allocation rule. In the author's view this should, 
however, not be an issue for the countries that have implemented the deemed interest rule but 
for the countries that will not apply the group-wide rule. If a country allows a deduction of 
interest actually incurred and that amount exceeds the amount that would have been 
deductible under a worldwide interest allocation rule, the tax base of that country is eroded 
rather than the tax base of the countries that did implement a deemed interest rule. This may 
drive countries to spontaneously adopt a worldwide interest allocation rule.
40
 
 
Apparently the fear for double deductions is the decisive factor in this matter, as the countries 
involved in the discussion draft agree that an interest limitation rule should be structured as an 
interest cap rule.
41
 This does not mean that they do not see the risk that part of group’s third 
party interest expense might not be deductible. However, the discussion draft downplays this 
risk by suggesting that groups should be able to adapt their funding structure in order to align 
the interest actually incurred by group entities with the deduction allowed under the interest 
cap rule. This means that it is crucial that the outcome of the interest cap rule is predictable. It 
follows that it will be very difficult to use earnings as an allocation factor (see paragraph 3.6) 
or to allocate a group's currency exchange results on borrowings to entities of the group 
because earnings and currency exchange results are not predictable. Consequently, the choice 
for an interest cap rule has far-reaching consequences for the design of the group-wide rule. 
 
3.3.2. Suggestion for a “transfer mechanism” 
                                               
38 Para 70. 
39 Para 75. 
40 See Vleggeert (2014), p. 107. 
41 Para 77. 
 The author prefers the deemed interest rule because it avoids economic double taxation of 
interest, and because it offers more flexibility in the design of the group-wide rule. However, 
if the countries involved in the discussion draft persist in their choice for an interest cap rule, 
the author suggests supplementing the rule with a transfer mechanism to mitigate the risk of 
economic double taxation of interest. Such a mechanism could operate as follows.  
 
 
A group entity that has interest expenses that are lower than the interest cap, is allowed to 
make a deductible payment to another group entity that has interest expenses that exceed the 
interest cap. The recipient has to include the amount transferred in its taxable profit and is at 
the same time allowed to increase the interest cap with this amount. This can be illustrated by 
using the same example as in paragraph 3.1. In this example foreign subsidiary’s actual 
interest expense is 45 whereas its interest cap is 48. Under the transfer-mechanism foreign 
subsidiary is allowed to make a deductible payment of 3 to holdco. The payment is treated as 
interest for purposes of the interest cap rule. As a result foreign subsidiary's interest expense 
will equal the amount of the interest cap (48). In the example holdco’s actual interest expense 
is 35 whereas holdco’s interest cap is 32. Under the transfer-mechanism the amount that 
holdco receives from foreign subsidiary is added to holdco’s interest cap. Therefore holdco’s 
interest cap will be 35 and as a result holdco is allowed to deduct its entire interest expense. 
 
In order to avoid abuse, it is important that the transfer mechanism is only applicable if both 
the country of the payor and the country of the payee apply a group-wide interest rule. In 
addition to this the amount paid under the transfer mechanism by a group entity should not 
exceed the difference between its interest cap and actual interest expense. Moreover, the 
amount paid to another group entity cannot exceed the difference between the actual interest 
expense and the interest cap of that entity. As the size of the amount to be transferred can only 
be determined after the end of the book year to which the deductible payment relates, the 
deduction should be subject to the condition that the amount will be paid within for example 
one year after the end of the book year concerned. 
 
The transfer-mechanism should ensure that a group’s third-party interest is always deductible 
somewhere within groups that only have domestic operations. In addition the transfer-
mechanism should apply to cross-border situations because otherwise the EU treaty freedoms 
would be infringed. This means that the risk of economic double taxation of interest will also 
be mitigated in cross-border situations. In contrast to the deemed interest rule, the application 
of the transfer mechanism in cross-border situations cannot operate as an incentive for groups 
to raise third party borrowings in countries which do not apply the rule.  
 
3.4. Focus on gross position or net position (also taking into account interest income or 
debt assets)? 
 
The next question is whether an interest limitation rule should be applied on a gross or net 
basis. A gross interest limitation rule will apply to interest incurred whereas a net interest 
limitation rule will apply to the difference between interest incurred an interest income earned 
on loans and deposits (net interest expense). Firstly, this means that under a net interest rule 
the amount that is allocated is a group’s net third party interest expense (the difference 
between third party interest incurred and third party interest received). Secondly, it entails that 
the non-deductible amount is the difference between a group entity’s net interest expense 
(interest incurred less interest received) and the interest cap. The discussion draft proposes 
that an interest limitation rule should apply on a net basis because a gross interest rule could 
lead to double taxation of interest paid on intragroup loans.
42
 This can be illustrated by using 
the same example as in paragraph 3.1. except that holdco now provides a loan of 30 to foreign 
subsidiary. Consequently the balance sheets are as follows: 
 
Consolidated balance sheet 
Assets  1000 Equity 200 
   Debt 800 
 
Balance sheet holdco     Balance sheet foreign subsidiary 
Assets  400 Equity 200   Assets  600 Equity 120 
Participation 120 Debt 350      Debt 480 
Loan to sub.   30 
 
The third party interest allocated to holdco and foreign subsidiary is still 32 and 48 
respectively (note that assets are used as an allocation factor and that for purposes of 
calculating holdco’s relevant assets not only the participation but also the intragroup loan is 
excluded as these assets do not appear on the consolidated balance sheet). However, holdco’s 
non-deductible interest is now calculated on a net basis. Holdco’s net interest expense is 35 – 
3 (10% on 30) is 32. As this amount equals the interest cap the interest incurred by holdco is 
entirely deductible. The interest incurred by foreign subsidiary (48) is also fully deductible as 
it equals the amount of foreign subsidiary’s interest cap. 
 
The author submits that the same result could be achieved under an interest limitation rule that 
is applied on a gross basis provided that interest received on intragroup loans is exempted. 
Under a gross interest rule holdco’s non-deductible interest would amount to 3 but interest on 
the loan to foreign subsidiary (3) would be exempt. In fact this alternative is better suited to 
avoid double taxation of interest on intragroup loans than the net interest rule that is proposed 
in the discussion draft. This can be illustrated by using the same example except that holdco 
now has provided a loan of 100 to foreign subsidiary. Consequently the balance sheets are as 
follows: 
 
Consolidated balance sheet 
Assets  1000 Equity 200 
   Debt 800 
 
Balance sheet holdco     Balance sheet foreign subsidiary 
Assets  400 Equity 200   Assets  600  Equity  50 
Participation   50 Debt 350      Debt   550 
Loan to sub. 100 
 
Again, the third party interest allocated to holdco and foreign subsidiary is 32 and 48 
respectively. Holdco’s net interest expense is 35 – 10 (10% on 100) is 25. As this amount is 
lower than holdco’s interest cap, the interest incurred by holdco is fully deductible. However 
as the interest on the loan to foreign subsidiary is taxable, holdco’s net deduction is only 25. 
Foreign subsidiary's net interest expense is 55. As this amount exceeds foreign subsidiary’s 
interest cap the difference of 7 is not deductible. This is the amount that is subject to 
economic double taxation. However, if alternatively the interest limitation rule is applied on a 
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gross basis and interest received on intragroup loans is exempted, holdco’s deductible interest 
expense will amount to 32 (3 being non-deductible) and interest on the loan to foreign 
subsidiary will be exempt. As a result the group's third party interest is effectively entirely 
deductible. 
 
In conclusion, an interest limitation rule that operates on a gross basis and exempts interest 
received on intragroup loans is better suited to avoid economic double taxation than a net 
interest limitation rule. Also the discussion draft points out that a gross interest rule is likely to 
be more difficult for groups to avoid through planning than a net interest rule: “a rule which 
applies to net interest expense could be ineffective if groups can avoid the rule by converting 
other forms of taxable income into interest income, reducing the level of net interest to which 
the rule can apply. In addition, applying a rule to net interest expense would mean it has no 
impact on entities, such as banks, which are recipients of net interest income”.43 Therefore, 
the author submits that an interest limitation rule should operate on a gross rather than a net 
basis. 
 
However, there are two issues that need to be addressed if a gross interest rule is applied and 
interest received on intragroup loans is exempted. First, as pointed out in paragraph 3.1. under 
an interest cap rule countries might allow a group entity to carry forward the amount of non-
deductible interest to future periods in order to avoid economic double taxation. In the 
example this would mean that foreign subsidiary is allowed to carry forward the non-
deductible interest of 7. However, if the interest on the loan to foreign subsidiary is exempt 
for holdco there is no need to allow foreign subsidiary a carry forward because the group's 
third party interest is effectively entirely deductible. Therefore, under an interest cap rule, a 
carry forward should only be granted to the extent the amount of non-deductible interest 
exceeds the group entity’s interest on intragroup debt. 
 
Secondly, countries might be concerned about opportunities for abuse if a rule exempting 
interest received on intragroup loans were to be implemented. This rule could be an incentive 
to provide intragroup loans to group entity’s that are resident in countries that have not 
implemented a group-wide interest rule and consequently would allow a deduction for 
intragroup interest. Therefore an exemption for interest received on intragroup loans should 
only apply provided that the country of the debtor has implemented a group-wide rule that 
allows a deduction of interest on the basis of allocation of the group's third party interest. 
 
3.5. Group-wide interest allocation rule or group ratio rule? 
 
A subsequent issue is whether a group-wide interest allocation rule or a group ratio rule 
should apply. A group-wide interest allocation rule operates by allocating a group’s net third-
party interest expense to group entities. A group ratio rule compares a financial ratio such as 
net interest to earnings or net interest to assets values of a group entity with that of the 
worldwide group. To the extent an entity’s ratio is above that of the group, its net interest 
expense is disallowed. The discussion draft observes that these two approaches are in 
principle very similar.
44
 On the other hand the discussion draft submits that countries might 
have greater flexibility in the design of a group ratio rule: “for the purposes of this 
consultation document, it is anticipated that an interest allocation rule would be applied 
consistently, with all countries applying the rule reaching agreement on the main elements 
(such as the definition of a group, the calculation of the group’s net third party interest 
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expense, and the allocation of interest expense between group entities). On the other hand, a 
group ratio rule would be applied more flexibly, with greater scope for a country to use its 
own approaches for determining each of these elements (…).”45 However, flexibility comes at 
the expense of consistency. Differences between group ratio rules in different countries could 
give rise to economic double taxation of interest or create opportunities for beps.
46
 The author 
therefore prefers interest allocation rules that are applied consistently by as many countries as 
possible. 
 
3.6. Measuring economic activity using earnings or asset values? 
 
A group-wide rule allocates a group’s net third-party interest to the group entities in 
accordance with a measure of economic activity. The discussion draft considers extensively 
whether economic activity should be measured using earnings or asset values. In order to 
avoid a significant compliance burden for groups the discussion draft proposes to use 
accounting figures to measure earnings or asset values.
47
 The discussion draft submits that the 
level of earnings is usually the clearest indicator of value creation across the group.
48
 In 
addition the level of earnings is a direct measure of an entity's ability to meet its obligations to 
pay interest.
49
 Further a group-wide rule measuring economic activity using earnings is better 
suited to counter beps than rule using asset values because it directly links the deduction of 
interest to the level of earnings.
50
 On the other hand the value of an entity’s assets is a key 
factor in determining the amount of debt it is able to borrow.
51
 Another important feature of 
asset values is that they are more predictable than earnings: “This means that using asset 
values as a basis for measuring economic activity within a group should give rise to a 
relatively steady and predictable limit on the level of relief that can be claimed. This would 
improve certainty for groups and could also reduce compliance costs. In addition, an approach 
based on asset values would mean that entities with losses would still be able to deduct an 
amount of net interest expense, which would not be possible under an earnings-based 
approach.”52 
 
The author submits that if the countries involved in the discussion draft persist in their choice 
for an interest cap rule, the predictability of asset values should be the decisive factor. As 
explained in paragraph 3.3 an interest cap rule implies that groups must be able to adapt their 
funding structure to the outcome of the rule. It follows that it is crucial that the outcome of an 
interest cap rule is predictable. The author is of the view that this means that earnings are 
therefore less suitable as an allocation factor than asset values as earnings tend to be less 
predictable. Consequently under an interest cap rule economic activity should be measured 
using asset values. 
 
The discussion draft correctly submits that not all categories of assets should be included in 
the calculation of an entity’s asset values. It also further notes that, in the view of the present 
author, assets that are not included in a multinational’s consolidated balance sheet should be 
excluded from an entity’s asset values. Consequently shareholdings in other group companies 
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and loans granted to other group companies should be ignored.
53
 The discussion draft 
suggests also excluding equity investments that are not group companies provided that they 
generate tax exempt and tax deferred income and financial assets that are not loans to other 
group companies if they give rise to interest income.
54
 However, this suggestion conflicts with 
the objective to make sure that a group‘s third-party interest is deductible somewhere as these 
assets are included in the group's consolidated balance sheet. 
 
The main disadvantage of using asset values to measure economic activity, is that internally 
created intangibles are typically not on a group's commercial balance sheet. The discussion 
draft recognises that the impact of this is that for a number of large groups the group’s most 
valuable assets will not be taken into account.
55
 The author therefore suggest to give groups 
the option to measure economic activity using earnings rather than asset values on the 
condition that the earnings method is applied consistently throughout the group. 
 
3.7. The treatment of non-deductible interest expense and double taxation 
 
Chapter XII of the discussion draft deals with the treatment of non-deductible interest expense 
and double taxation. It appears that the objective to counter beps takes precedence over the 
principle that a group’s third-party interest should always be deductible somewhere (or in 
other words: that economic double taxation on interest is avoided): “While the critical aim of 
this work is to prevent base erosion and profit shifting, the countries involved in this work are 
also concerned by the risk of economic double taxation and agree that this should be avoided 
where possible. At the same time it is recognised that double taxation may arise as a result of 
structures that were implemented to achieve base erosion and profit shifting outcomes.”56 This 
section implies that according to the countries that are involved in the discussion draft 
economic double taxation on interest might be acceptable in cases where multinationals 
deliberately intend to erode the tax base through interest expenses. The author submits that 
this line of reasoning is debatable as it may not be possible to determine whether beps was 
intended. Moreover, the group-wide rule does not attempt to ascertain whether a group 
planned to erode the tax base (i.e. intent). 
 
The discussion draft proposes to avoid economic double taxation on interest by providing for 
a carryforward of disallowed interest expense and possibly for a carryforward of unused 
capacity to deduct interest.
57
 In order to avoid that a carryforward provision is abused, the 
discussion draft suggests that it should be restricted in terms of the number of years of a 
carryforward and possibly also as to the amount of the carryforward.
58
 
 
4. Do the worldwide interest allocation rules meet the main policy concerns? 
 
This paragraph discusses whether the group-wide rule meets the first three policy concerns 
that were identified in paragraph 2. This paragraph will not deal with EU law issues (these 
issues will be considered as the work on action 4 progresses) and the fairness of a group-wide 
rule (this issue is examined in paragraph 2.6).  
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The main objective of the discussion draft is to address beps using interest on third-party and 
related party loans. In paragraph 2.2. four techniques to achieve beps are recognized. First, the 
group-wide rule should counter the use of intragroup loans to generate deductible interest cost 
in high tax jurisdictions and taxable interest income in low tax jurisdictions. The group-wide 
rule achieves this aim because a group’s deductible interest cannot exceed the group’s third-
party interest. Therefore it is no longer possible to create additional deductions by entering 
into intragroup loans. Secondly, the group-wide rule should deal with the use of interest 
deductions to fund income which is exempt or deferred for tax purposes. This is accomplished 
because equity investments which give rise to exempt or deferred dividend income are 
excluded if asset values are used as an allocation factor (dividends are excluded if earnings 
are used as an allocation factor). Thirdly, the group-wide rule should avoid the allocation of a 
disproportionate share of a group's total third-party interest cost to high taxed operating 
companies. The rule does this because it attributes a group’s third-party interest expense to the 
group entities based on objective allocation factor. Finally a group-wide rule should tackle 
hybrid mismatches resulting in double non-taxation of interest. The rule does address hybrid 
instruments which give rise to deductible interest expense but no corresponding taxable 
income because these instruments are typically structured as intragroup loans. However, other 
hybrid mismatches such as double deduction schemes that use a hybrid entity are not 
addressed. These mismatches should be dealt with in the work that is done on Action 2 
(hybrid mismatches). In conclusion, it is submitted that the group-wide rule meets the main 
objective to address beps using interest expense. 
 
In the second place a group-wide rule should not give rise to economic double taxation of 
interest. This means that a group’s third-party interest should be deductible somewhere within 
the group. The author favors a deemed interest rule that allows for a deduction of the amount 
of a group third-party interest that is attributed to each group entity irrespective of the interest 
that is actually incurred by an entity. However, the discussion draft proposes an interest cap 
rule that provides that the interest incurred by an entity cannot exceed the amount of a group’s 
third party interest that is allocated to it. An excess will not be deductible but may be carried 
to future years. The discussion draft proposes that the carryforward should be restricted in 
terms of the number of years. It follows that a group third-party interest may - in part - not be 
deductible if a group entity is not able to use the carryforward in time. In order to mitigate the 
risk of economic double taxation of interest the author therefore suggests supplementing the 
interest cap rule with a mechanism that allows for the transfer of unused capacity to deduct 
interest of an entity to another entity that has interest expense that exceeds the interest cap. 
 
The discussion draft proposes that a group-wide rule should apply on a net basis because a 
gross interest rule could lead to double taxation of interest paid on intragroup loans. However, 
the author submits that an interest limitation rule that operates on a gross basis and exempts 
interest received on intragroup loans is better suited to avoid economic double taxation than a 
net rule. In order to avoid abuse the exemption should only apply provided that the country of 
the debtor has a group-wide rule. Assuming the countries involved in the discussion draft 
persist in their choice for an interest cap rule, the author submits that the rule should operate 
as a gross rule and be supplemented with a transfer-mechanism. 
 
The third policy concern involves minimizing distortions to competition and investment and 
providing certainty of outcome. These policy concerns imply in the first place that a group-
wide rule should be applied consistently by as many countries as possible. Secondly the 
implications of the rule should be predictable in order to enable groups to adapt their funding 
structure to the outcome of the interest cap rule. The author is of the view that this means that 
earnings are less suitable as an allocation factor than asset values because earnings tend to be 
less predictable. Therefore, asset values should be used to attribute a group’s third-party 
interest expense. Furthermore it could be considered give groups the option to measure 
economic activity using earnings provided that earnings will be used as an allocation factor 
consistently throughout the group. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The discussion draft proposes a group-wide rule that limits the amount of interest which can 
be deducted by each entity to a part of the group’s third-party interest expense. The author 
welcomes this approach, which appears to be suited to counter beps using interest expenses. 
However, the author suggests that the countries involved in the discussion draft adapt the 
group-wide rule to mitigate the risk of economic double taxation of third-party interest. 
Therefore, the author favors a deemed interest rule that allows for a deduction of the amount 
of a group’s third-party interest that is attributed to each group entity irrespective of the 
interest that is actually incurred by an entity. 
